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Abstract 
A hazard and risk analysis (H&RA) of events or systems, which have multiple preventive or mitigative safety features, usually 
requires the application of redundancy rules in order to arrive at a credible answer. The process industry typically refers to these 
preventive or mitigative safety features as protection layers. Aggregate system safety performance assessments can become 
complicated because of the application of those redundancy rules to the individual protection layers. In industrial engineering 
settings there is a desire to simplify such assessments. A first simplification can be readily done by expanding the െߣݐ series, of 
the individual reliability functions, and using only the first two terms.This is acceptable when ߣݐ is small enough; e.g., (ߣݐ ൏
ͲǤͲͳሻ but places a ceiling condition on the product of ߣ and the proof test interval, T, which is a maintenance variable.A second 
simplification is made by using the average probability of failure upon demand (	 ൌ ͲǤͷߣܶ) of a protection layer as a true 
probability in probability calculations, regardless of exposure time restrictions. A third simplification occurs when a system, 
which consists of several parallel redundant protection layers, has its system PFD determined by a simple multiplication of the 
	 Ԣs of the individual protection layers. Industrial H&RAs are usually conducted without reference to any of the implied 
simplifications. The paper discusses different PFD determination results for several common protection configurations and 
compares them with current industry H&RA practices. It also exposes deficiencies in the most common current industry practices 
for safety integrity analysis. 
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Nomenclature 
O dangerous failure rate 
t time, a variable 
T proof test, or other time, interval 
PFD probability of failure on demand 
PFDavg average PFD over a given time interval 
RRF risk reduction factor 
RRFavg average RRF over a given time interval 
e base of natural logarithm 
SIF safety instrumented function 
SIS safety instrumented system 
SIL safety integrity level 
LOPA layer of protection analysis 
HazOp hazard and operability study 
H&RA hazard and risk analysis 
IPL independent protection layer 
1. Introduction 
Proper risk management is a pre-requisite for an organization’s sustainability in a competitive environment.  In 
the process industry, risk management is foremost associated with meeting operational requirements, in a safe and 
reliable manner.  The success of risk management depends on several factors which include appropriate 
implementation tools and accurate risk information.  Risk information has to be of a quality that enables decision-
makers to make risk-informed decisions.  The information can be acquired through quantitative, semi-quantitative or 
qualitative risk assessment techniques.  Results of such assessments should always be accompanied by an indication 
of their accuracy; this has often been a weak point.  The Risø-R-1344 report [1] evaluated competitive quantitative 
risk analyses, done on defined hazards by experts; it showed that results can vary by several orders of magnitude.  It 
is to be expected that results of risk assessments, performed by non-experts, would be subject to an even wider range 
of divergence in risk assessment results.  This will be true for industry staff charged with doing a H&RA when their 
daily tasks involves dealing with engineering and operational issues. The process industry generally favors 
qualitative and semi-quantitative assessments, because they put fewer constraints on limited resources and time, than 
rigorous quantitative risk assessments.  A semi-quantitative risk analysis implies that either the consequence or the 
probability/frequency part of the analysis needs to be done quantitatively.  In the process industry this is; however, 
often not the case and a semi-quantitative label can be assigned to an approach that relies on parameterized opinions.  
Numerical results of such semi-quantitative methods, without an uncertainty indication, need to be used with care.  
For example, Layer of Protection Analysis, or LOPA [2] alleges to be accurate within one order of magnitude, a 
claim that is untenable when compared with the results of [1]. 
2. LOPA 
LOPA is a self-proclaimed order-of-magnitude risk analysis method that builds on qualitative hazard evaluations 
such as HazOp Studies.  Its goal is to analyze selected scenarios and thereby assess whether the risk posed by each 
scenario has been reduced, through safeguards or IPLs, to a residual value that is deemed acceptable.  If, after 
accounting for the IPLs, the residual risk is still too high,additional risk reduction will be needed.  This will usually 
be a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) [3, 4] with enough safety integrity to meet the required risk goal.  LOPA 
measures IPL performance in terms of a probability of failure upon demand or PFD, which is an unfortunate 
choice.In reality IPL performance is given by an average PFD, or PFDavg, which is measured over the time interval 
of its maintenance cycle.   
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The promise of a simple tool to perform risk analyses, combined with the benefit of being able to use pre-
screened HazOp scenarios makes LOPA a tempting safety engineering process for the process industry.  This is 
especially true for organizations that routinely perform HazOps, such as oil refineries and the larger (petro) chemical 
manufacturers.  Embracing LOPA by these large players has resulted in a large number of publications, some of 
which with default (PFDavg) values for IPLs that are commonly used in process designs.  Such impromptu databases 
are frequently used without analyzingpotential differencesthat could preclude their use such as differences with 
respect to: 
x Environment. 
x Design. 
x Operating conditions. 
x Maintenance and proof test interval requirements. 
Further H&RA streamlining occurs when published data are augmented with in-house generated or “believed” 
IPLPFDavgdataand applicable mathematical restrictions are ignored.  The LOPA process relies on pre-screened 
scenarios that are analyzed in terms of “initiating event - loss event” chains.  It ignores mutually exclusive initiating 
events that result in the same loss event; this can result in an under-estimation of the overallinitiating event 
likelihood, especially in repetitive systems.  Another simplification, which is not legitimate, is the fact that LOPA 
determines a preventive systems “PFD” by a simple multiplication of the PFDavg values of the available preventive 
action IPLs.  While both prevention and mitigation IPLs will lower the risk of the scenario; the preventive IPLs are 
important from theirlikelihood modification perspective and the issues surrounding their parallel redundancy 
calculations.   
3. Redundancies 
3.1. Parallel redundancy 
Parallel redundancy characterizes a situation where several IPLs exist that each, individually, can prevent an 
initiating event from evolving into an undesired consequence. In essence all preventive IPLs must fail before the 
consequence can materialize. Multi-tiered safeguards are commonly the topic of LOPA and Bow-Tie studies.  An 
IPL that operates in a constant failure rate domain (OzO(t)), and that consist of a single piece of equipment or a 
series of components, has a PFD that is given by [5]: 
	 ሺݐሻ ൌ ሺͳ െ െߣݐ ሻ                                                                      (1) 
The term െߣݐ  in (1) represents the reliability. It can be readily expanded without a major error as long as ߣݐ is 
sufficiently small; e.g., < 0.01.  In such a case it is common to take the first two expansion terms; i.e., (ͳെ ߣݐሻ, 
which yields: 
	 ሺݐሻ ൌ ߣݐ                                                                                    (2) 
An average IPL PFD for a time interval T can be calculated for (2) by integration from t=0 to t=T and division by 
T: 
	 ൌ ͳܶ ׬ ߣݐݐ
ݐൌܶ
ݐൌͲ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ ߣܶ                                                                   (3) 
The aggregate or system PFD of a system consisting of a number of IPLs is defined by: 
	 ሺݐሻ ൌ ς 	ܫܲܮ݅ ሺݐሻ݊݅ൌͳ                                                              (4) 
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For a system protected by three parallel redundant IPLs, the system PFD(t) can be written as PFD1oo3(t) = 
PFDIPL1(t) × PFDIPL2(t) × PFDIPL3(t). When assumingidentical and constant failure rates the PFD1oo3(t) can be 
rewritten as: 
	ͳ͵ሺݐሻ ൌ ͳെ ͵െߣݐ ൅ ͵െʹߣݐ െ െ͵ߣݐ                                               (5) 
PFD1oo3 in (Eq. 5) has three exponential terms which show that a series expansion will not be straightforward. 
Furthermore while each of the IPLs had identical and constant failure rates; this will not be the case for the system’s 
aggregate failure rate.  Therefore when an average system PFD needs to be determined for systems with parallel 
redundancy then it should be done through proper integration and time averaging, as required by IEC [6].  LOPA 
ignores these requirements and calculates an aggregate system PFDavg by merely multiplying the PFDavg of the 
individual IPLs.  This Boolean approach is fundamentally incorrect and can result in a gross under-estimation of risk 
for a system that is protected by multi-tiered IPLs.  
3.2. Serial and mixed redundancy 
The PFD(t) of a serial redundant system is defined by: 
	 ሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ ሺς െߣݐ݊݅ൌͳ ሻ ൌ ͳ െ െݐൈሺσ ߣ݅݊݅ൌͳ ሻ                                        (6) 
Safety systems are often a mix of parallel and serial redundancies because different safety or operational aspects; 
e.g., avoiding spurious trips need to be satisfied. Examples of system with different redundancies are shown in Fig. 
1; the objective in each case is to maintain flow from S (start) to F (finish). Figure 1(a) shows parallel redundancy 
examples where the objective, of maintaining flow, is satisfied as long as one of the entities remains functional. 
Figure 1(b) and (c) show a combination of parallel and serial redundancies. For example, flow through entity 1 in 
Figure 1(b) requires that both component 1a and component 1b remain functional, which is a case of serial 
redundancy.  On the other hand entity 1 and entity 2 back each other up, which is a parallel redundancy situation.   
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) example of parallel redundancy; (b) example of  a mix of serial (components) and parallel (entities) redundancy (2x2); (c)example of 
mixed redundancy (2x2 XO). 
Table 1 lists several common systems with their PFDavg as determined through a rigorous integration, IEC 
integration and simple Boolean multiplication of the PFDavg of a 1oo1 system. Fig. 2 displays the 
PFDavgperformance graphs for a 1oo3 system with parallel redundancy for these determination methods.  
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Fig. 2. PFDavg curves, as determined by rigorous, IEC and Boolean determination methods, for a 1oo3 parallel redundant system. 
Table 1.PFDavgfor common systems (using rigorous integration of exponential equations; IEC approach, using 
integration of expanded single systems; and the Boolean approach, by multiplication of PFDavg of a single system 
(using it as a true probability). 
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4. Recurring LOPA, IEC, H&RA, and Design Issues. 
4.1. Single initiating event - loss event relationships 
In order to avoid complexity, LOPA focuses on a single initiating event - loss event relationships; i.e., by design 
it overlooks relationships between different initiating events that result in the same consequence. Erratic initiating 
event identification, as often happens in hazard and risk analyses, results then too often in a failure to account for the 
multiple initiating events leading to a single loss event.  
 
For example, in a hydrogen plant, water can be carried over from the process steam system to the reformer and 
cause awater - steam transition explosion. Initiating events include condensate accumulation during an intermittent 
shutdown, pump issues and flow control issues. HazOps are not good at identifying common consequence events 
and LOPA avoids them. Consequentlythe phase transition risk could end up being allocated to several sub-scenarios. 
The risk of each sub-scenario will be lower than the overall phase transition explosion risk. It is possible that the 
allocation will render each unique initiating event - loss event chain incrementally tolerable even when the overall 
risk is unacceptable. Similarly, it is possible that the incremental risks will be just above the tolerable threshold and 
result in over-protection. Another possibility is that the process hazard analysis team decides that a single sub-
scenario is representative for the overall risk and move on; i.e., abdicates its responsibilities.  
4.2. Different definitions  
Differences in definitions for common terms in the IEC standards and LOPA literature has been a recurring 
source of discussion and arguments in H&RAs. This has resulted in different project teams coming up with different 
solutions for similar problems.  Important differences, from a H&RA perspective are:  
x Independent protection layer (IPL): where the IEC standard 61511 Part 3 specifies a necessary risk reduction 
attribute of a factor of 100 [8] versus the 2001 LOPA book that uses a factor of 10 [9].  
x Independent: where the IEC standard 61508 Part 1 [10] specifies “If the control system, SIS and other risk 
reduction measures are to be treated as independent for the allocation (of risk reduction measures), they shall be 
independent such, that the likelihood of simultaneous failures between two or more of these different systems or 
measures is sufficiently low, in relation to the required safety integrity; not share common parts, services or 
support systems (for example power supplies) whose failure could result in a dangerous mode of failure of all 
systems. Not share common operational, maintenance or test procedures” versus the 2001 LOPA book that 
focuses on hardware.  
The industry typically follow the LOPA definitions; a strict interpretation of the IEC standard’s clause of not 
sharing “common operational, maintenance or test procedures” would be somewhat difficult to justify because non-
routine activities tend to be more hazard prone. 
4.3. Target risk reduction values for safety instrumented functions  
Assigning a SIL to a specific SIF isfrequently done using qualitative tools such as a SIL graph [11] or a risk 
matrix thatexpresses a required risk reduction in terms of a SIL. This creates a SIS design dilemma because a SIL 
number represents a range rather than an explicit RRF value (see Table 2).  Where such a qualitative approach is 
used, the IEC requires that the specified target failure measure will be the SIL’s smallest PFDavg(or greatest RRFavg) 
[12].  Technical literature and commercial SIF architecture design reports often gloss over this IEC requirement. 
While this IEC “err on the safe side” position is common sense; it also means that SIS designs will overshoot the 
target. An acceptable average safety integrity design for a SIF would be somewhere from 2/3rdto its full range.  For a 
SIF with a SIL 2 it means that its design must have an RRFavg range of > 667 and up to and including 1,000. Table 3 
provides a specimenof an actual report that ignored the IEC greater RRF requirement and therefore contains flawed 
target risk reduction statements.  
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Table 2 Safety integrity levels and their target failure measures (PFDavg) values for SIFs that operate in a low demand 
mode. Also shown, specified SIL target failure values for qualitatively determined SILs 
Safety 
Integrity 
Requirement 
(SIL) 
Average probability of a 
dangerous failure on 
demand PFDavg 
Risk Reduction Factor 
(RRFavg) 
IEC specified SIL target failure values 
where a qualitative SIL analysis method 
was used [12] 
PFDavg RRFavg 
4 ≥ 10-5 to < 10-4 > 10,000 ≤ 100,000 10
-5 100,000 
3 ≥ 10-4 to < 10-3 > 1,000 ≤ 10,000 10
-4 10,000 
2 ≥ 10-3 to < 10-2 > 100 ≤ 1,000 10
-3 1,000 
1 ≥ 10-2 to < 10-1 > 10 ≤ 100 10
-2 100 
 
 
Table 3 Specimen of flawed “Required Risk Reduction Factor” statements in a SIF architecture table; calculated RRFs 
have to be greater than or fall inside the acceptable range.  
SIF Tag 
Number 
SIL target, 
specified by 
Risk 
Reduction 
Factor H&RA 
SIS designer 
specified 
“Required Risk 
Reduction Factor 
(RRFavg)” 
Acceptable SIS 
design “Risk 
Reduction 
Factor 
(RRFavg)” 
Calculated 
Risk 
Reduction 
Factor 
(RRFavg) 
Testing 
Frequency(SE/LS/FE) 
(Months) 
SAGD-
001 2 
100 667 - 1000 342 48/48/48 
SAGD-
002 1 
10 67 - 100 160 48/48/48 
SAGD-
003 2 
100 667 - 1000 323 48/48/48 
 
5. Discussion 
The 1oo3 system PFDavg curves in Fig. 2 show the (Boolean) approach as producing an outlying curve while the 
(Exp. Eq.) and (EIC) curves seem to be much closer. This happens to be true for T > 35,040 hours (4 years), at 
which time the (IEC) curve understates the risk of failure on demand by less than 33 percent; i.e., 1.34444E-06 
versus 1.98917E-06. Unfortunately, a maintenance frequency of once every four years is very common in the 
process industry and the error at shorter time intervals is much greater. At T = 8,760 hours (1 year) the (IEC) 
approach understates the actual PFDavg, which was calculated rigorously from exponential equations without 
simplifications, by a factor of 33. This put the validity of using PFDavg equations that have been simplified by 
exponential series expansion for parallel systems into question. This is in addition to an error that will exist because 
of the neglect of common cause failures. 
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It was further found that there are potentially several serious deficiencies with popular H&RA methodologies; 
e.g., LOPA. An important deficiency affects the process of how the scope of a SIL analysis is populated from a 
hazard identification tool such as HazOp. Other deficiencies arise from the rather arbitrary (one cause-one 
consequence) LOPA simplification rules and misinterpretation of IEC standards because a SIL number represents a 
range rather than a crisp number. This misinterpretation can cause a SIS design safety requirements specification to 
have flawed; i.e., RRFavg targets that are too low (see Table 3). 
The findings give credence to the observation that accuracies of semi-quantitative H&RAs are overstated and 
secondly, because the deficiencies have an “unsafe” trend, the results of H&RAs should be reviewed closely and 
taking “iffy” IPL credits avoided.  
6. Conclusions  
x Multi-layered safeguards’ actual risk reduction performance will fall short of what a LOPA would suggest.  
x Qualitative and “semi-quantitative” H&RAs that rely on a “single initiating event - loss event relationships” can 
be subject to serious shortcomings when the analysis team does not account for common-cause –loss event 
scenarios.  
x The properties, and limitations – especially those related to proof test intervals, of PFDavgshould be explained to 
H&RA teams before the start of an H&RA.  
x Expressing a SIF’s desired risk reductionin terms of a SIL number; i.e., a range, rather than an actual target value 
is not helpful. It creates confusion and provides opportunities for design and risk misinterpretation. 
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